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1 Introduction
The common assumption underlying banking regulation is that, along with capital
requirements, more sophistication in rating and risk management increases the stability
of a banking system. This is epitomized in the Basel II regulatory framework. This
raises the question of what the aggregate consequences and their impact on stability
are when a banking system becomes more sophisticated in its ability to assess the
default risk of investing firms. We investigate the case when banks compete for loans
and deposits but cannot adjust their initial equity. This situation corresponds to the
short term. The long term when banks may adjust their initial equity is treated in the
twin paper Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2006). There it is shown that sophisticated risk
management may decrease banking stability.
We consider a competitive banking system embedded in a macroeconomic environment
in which banks offer intermediation services to a population of producing entrepreneurs
subject to macroeconomic risk. Entrepreneurs and bank owners have outside options
for investing their resources. As in Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2004), risk premia on
loans are determined by free exit and free entry conditions for banks. We distinguish
between a simple and a sophisticated banking system. Both systems are perfectly
competitive and start with the same level of equity, e.g. given by regulatory capital
requirements. In a simple banking system, banks are unable to assess the quality of
loan applicants individually and charge all entrepreneurs the same loan-interest rate.
In a sophisticated banking system, banks are able to assess the default risk of an
entrepreneur individually and offer entrepreneur-specific loan rates. The goal of the
paper is to investigate the influence of the rating ability of a banking system on market
conditions and banking stability.
Our main findings are as follows. First, a sophisticated banking system rewards produc-
ing entrepreneurs with low default risks with low loan interest rates. Aggregate repay-
ments of entrepreneurs are therefore lower than in a simple system. As a consequence,
the deposit rate of a sophisticated banking system is lower than in a simple banking
system, so that its refinancing costs are lower. Second, the sophisticated banking sys-
tem accumulates more equity only for adverse macroeconomic shocks. The intuition
is as follows. Banks earn only the liquidation value of a defaulting entrepreneurs. If a
sufficiently large number of bankruptcies occur due to adverse shocks, the simple bank-
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ing system’s advantage of higher aggregate repayments does not outweigh its higher
refinancing costs. Since refinancing costs are unaffected by a macroeconomic shock,
the sophisticated system accumulates more equity. Third, we show that the default
probability of a sophisticated banking system is only lower if the initial equity levels
are sufficiently high to buffer against losses. Otherwise, the simple system is less likely
to default, so that sophistication in a banking system decreases bank stability if initial
equity is too low. Finally, we develop compact formulas for risk premia, expected losses,
as well as value-at-risk and default probabilities for both banking systems embedded
in an aggregate equilibrium model.
The approach of this paper is complementary to the work of Gehrig & Stenbacka (2004)
who show that uncoordinated screening behavior of competing financial intermediaries
creates a financial multiplier and may be responsible for macroeconomic fluctuations.
In analyzing the systemic effects of screening activities by firms, this paper contributes
to the literature on screening by banks surveyed, for example, in Freixas & Rochet
(1997). An interesting question for future research is how even more sophisticated
risk management techniques such as the securitization of bank loans including the use
of derivative products affect systematic risks as discussed e.g. in Franke & Krahnen
(2006).
Our results are related to the literature on banking regulation. Comprehensive surveys
with different emphases are given by Bhattacharya & Thakor (1993), Dewatripont
& Tirole (1994), Hellwig (1994), Freixas & Rochet (1997), or Bhattacharya, Boot &
Thakor (1998). Overall our analysis suggests that the new regulatory policy for banking
(Basel II) that requires banks to introduce more sophistication in assessing the default
risk of their clients will only be beneficial if banks start with a sufficiently high level of
bank capital.
A large body of literature has investigated the consequences of modern risk manage-
ment techniques in capital markets which have risen dramatically over the last few
decades, cf. Carey & Stulz (2006). Although there is a large literature on sophistica-
tion in rating techniques1, its aggregate consequences are unknown. This calls for a
more detailed analysis of how sophisticated risk management tools affect the banking
system and the macroeconomy.
1For example, a set of intuitive rating principles have been developed by Krahnen & Weber (2001)
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The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce the model and
both types of banking systems. In section 3 we examine simple banks, and in section
4 we perform the mirror-image of the analysis for sophisticated banks. In section 5 we
compare both systems, leading on from there to our main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Households and entrepreneurs
We consider a two-period model with periods t = 1 and t = 2. The population of
agents consists of a continuum indexed by [0, 1]. Each agent has individual wealth W
in terms of cash in the first period. Agents are divided into two classes. One fraction
of agents, indexed by [0, η], are potential entrepreneurs. The other fraction, indexed
by (η, 1], are consumers. Potential entrepreneurs and consumers differ in that only the
former have access to investment technologies and will be the owner of banks.
Consumers are endowed with consumption preferences in the two periods of their lives,
with c1, c2 respectively denoting youthful and elderly consumption in money terms. For
simplification, let u(c1, c2) = ln (c1) + δ ln (c2) be the intertemporal utility function
of a consumer, where δ (0 < δ < 1) is the discount factor. Accordingly, a young
consumer inelastically saves the amount s = δ
1+δ
W if he can transfer wealth from
period 1 to period 2. We denote the aggregate savings of consumers by S = (1− η)s.
The assumption that the elasticity of aggregate savings is zero is made for ease of
presentation and for the purpose of deriving explicit formulas.2
Potential entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral and consume only in the second
period. Each entrepreneur has to decide whether to invest in a production project that
converts period-1 goods into period-2 goods or to channel their funds into an alternative
project with return 1 + rE (rE > 0). The alternative investment opportunity may be
thought of as an outside option, such as government bonds or investments in other
sectors of the economy that are not modeled explicitly.3
2Our model can be qualitatively extended to the case where the interest elasticity of consumer
savings is low.
3For tractability we assume that consumers are not allowed to invest in the alternative project.
This can be justified by liquidity services of deposits. However, the model could be qualitatively
extended to the case where consumers hold a portfolio of deposits and other assets. In this case, the
saving function is of the form S = S(rd, rE).
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The funds required for each investment project are fixed to W + I so that an en-
trepreneur must borrow I additional units of the good from banks to undertake the
investment project. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in the quality of their investment
projects which depends on their index i. The quality parameter of entrepreneur i is
assumed to be private information. If an entrepreneur of type i obtains additional
resources I and decides to invest, investment returns in the second period amount to
y = q(1 + i)f(W + I),
where f denotes a standard atemporal neoclassical production function and q ∈ R+
represents an exogenous macroeconomic productivity shock in the economy. Since W
and I will remain fixed throughout the paper, we write f = f(W +I). The distribution
of q is assumed to be given by a continuous density function h(q) with support on a
compact interval [q, q] with 0 < q < q.
Entrepreneurs are price-takers and operate under limited liability. Given a loan interest
rate rc, the expected profit of an investing entrepreneur i is
Π(i, rc) :=
∫ q
q
max{q(1 + i)f − I(1 + rc), 0} h(q)dq. (1)
Note that Π(i, rc) is monotonically increasing in quality levels i and monotonically
decreasing in loan rates rc. A risk-neutral entrepreneur with the quality parameter
i ∈ [0, η] will invest in the production project if the return on the investment project
is larger than the return on alternative investments, i.e.,
Π(i, rc) ≥ W (1 + rE).
We assume that savings are never sufficient to fund all entrepreneurs. Since the interest-
rate elasticity of savings is zero, this condition takes the form
S := (1− η) s < η I.
2.2 Simple and sophisticated banking
Depositors cannot observe the quality parameters of entrepreneurs and cannot verify
whether or not an entrepreneur invests. The existence of such market frictions neces-
sitates financial intermediation (see e.g. Hellwig 1994). To alleviate there information
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problems, we assume that there are n banks, indexed by j = 1, . . . , n (n > 1) which are
owned by potential entrepreneurs. As these bank owners are risk-neutral and consume
only in the second period, the objective of banks is to maximize profits accruing to
current shareholders. They monitor loans as delegated monitors in the sense of Dia-
mond (1984) and their monitoring is assumed to be efficient in the sense that they are
able to secure both the investment of an entrepreneur and the liquidation value in case
of default, cf. Gersbach & Uhlig (2005).
For a comparison based on the same premises, we make the same assumption regarding
the competitive environment of the banking sector. First, both banking systems are
perfectly competitive with free exit and free entry.4 Bank owners have the opportu-
nity to exit the banking industry and to invest their equity alternatively with return
rE (rE > 0). Second, both systems start with the same amount of aggregate equity e1
which consists of the value physical capital k1 and cash d1. More precisely, each bank
in each system starts with the same amount of initial cash holdings d1
n
and the same
value of physical capital k1
n
in period 1. The physical capital stock allows banks to
perform their intermediation services and consists of branches, IT systems and other
components of capital. To simplify the exposition we assume that capital does not
depreciate. The central assumption here is that equity is given, e.g. by regulatory
capital requirements, so that our short-term perspective is justified. Third, competi-
tion among banks determines deposit and loan-interest rates. Each bank j can offer
deposit contracts D(rd), where 1 + rd is the repayment offered for one unit of money.
We distinguish between a simple and a sophisticated banking system which differ only
in their ability to rate the quality of entrepreneurs.
1. Simple Banking System. The essential feature of the simple banking system
is that banks are unable to rate entrepreneurs individually and to adjust loan
contracts to the quality parameter i of an entrepreneur. Banks only have an
average rating of entrepreneurs and offer all entrepreneurs the same loan contract
C(rc), where 1 + rc is the repayment required from entrepreneurs for one unit of
borrowed money.
2. Sophisticated Banking System. In a sophisticated banking system, banks are
4The free-entry free-exit framework is a standard concept in industrial economics, e.g., see Vives
(2004).
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able to rate each entrepreneur individually and to offer entrepreneur-specific loan
contracts, denoted by C(rci ), where r
c
i is the loan interest rate demanded from an
entrepreneur of type i.
In both banking systems, banks operate under unlimited liability and loans are only
constrained by the amount of equity and deposits. We assume throughout that aggre-
gate uncertainty is canceled out when depositors and entrepreneurs randomly choose
banks.5 As all banks are identical, they will obtain the same amount of equity and
deposits.
With these assumptions, the financial intermediation process in either system is as
follows. In the first period banks offer deposit and loan contracts, given by rd and rc
(simple banking) or by rd and {rci}
η
i=0 (sophisticated banking), respectively. Each bank
j obtains an amount of dj in equity and an equal share of deposits from consumers.
Entrepreneurs decide which contracts to accept. Money is exchanged. In the second
period, entrepreneurs who have chosen the production project produce subject to a
macroeconomic shock and pay back loans with limited liability. Banks repay depositors.
The vulnerability of a banking system depends on its ability to accumulate equity.
This motivates a comparison of equity accumulation in the two banking systems. Of
particular interest are the probability distribution of equity and the downside equity
risk in the second period. Specifically, we will analyze the default probability for both
banking systems, i.e., the probability that equity becomes negative.
3 Competitive Equilibria for Simple Banks
Consider first the case in which banks use simple risk-management tools and are unable
to detect the quality parameter i of the production project. Recall that only the amount
of equity d1
n
can be used by a bank to finance loans. Physical capital cannot be used
to finance loans, but it allows to collect deposits and to grant loans. As all banks are
assumed to be identical, we will formulate the equilibrium conditions for the whole
banking system.
5The exact construction of individual randomness so that this statement holds can be found in
Alo´s-Ferrer (1999). We could also rely on the weaker forms of the strong law of large numbers
developed in Al-Najjar (1995) and Uhlig (1996), where independence of individual random variables
can be assumed and aggregate stability is the limit of an economy with finite characteristics.
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There is an upper boundary for d1, denoted by d := ηI − S, which, based on the
assumption made above, is positive. Since S + d = ηI, banks with d1 > d have more
equity than needed to finance all entrepreneurs. In this case, excess resources are
available at any interest rate. We exclude this uninteresting case from our analysis.
For each d1 ∈ [0, d], there exists a unique critical entrepreneur i∗ ∈ [0, η], given by
i∗ = i∗(d1) :=
d− d1
I
, (2)
such that savings are balanced by investments, i.e.,
S + d1 =
[
η − i∗(d1)
]
I. (3)
3.1 Equilibrium concept
Let d1 ∈ [0, d] be the amount of equity in the form of cash in the first period. Banks
raise funds S that have to be paid back with interest at the end of the second period. In
a competitive equilibrium loan demand must equal loan supply, so that (3) holds. Since
simple banks are unable to detect the quality parameter i, they charge all investing
entrepreneurs the same loan interest rate rc. Thus, simple banks lend
[
η− i∗
]
I to firms
and will receive payments P = P
(
q, i∗, r
c
)
at the end of the second period, given by
P
(
q, i∗, r
c
)
=
∫ η
i∗
min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
(
1 + rc
)}
di, (4)
where i∗ = i∗(d1). Given a pair of interest rates r
d, rc, the capital of the banking system
is given by a function G(q, ·, rd, rc) : [0, d] → R, defined by
G(q, d1, r
d, rc) = P
(
q, i∗(d1), r
c
)
− S(1 + rd), (5)
such that for each shock q and each rc, rd ≥ 0, d2 = G(q, d1, r
d, rc) is the equity level
of the banking system at the end of the second period. Note that a priori, physical
capital has no influence on second-period equity.
We next define a competitive equilibrium for a simple banking system. Intuitively, a
competitive equilibrium is a pair of interest rates
(
rd∗, r
c
∗
)
, such that
(i) no bank exits and no bank enters the market,
(ii) firms take optimal investment decisions,
8
(iii) loan demand equals loan supply.
In order to formalize this concept, observe that, given a pair of interest rates rd and
rc, the expected profits of the banking system are
E
[
G(·, d1, r
d, rc)
]
= E
[
P
(
·, i∗(d1), r
c
)]
− S(1 + rd) (6)
=
q∫
q
P
(
q, i∗(d1), r
c
)
h(q)dq − S(1 + rd).
Formally, a competitive equilibrium for a simple banking system is defined as follows:
Definition 1
Let d1 ∈ [0, d] denote the capital base and k1 > 0 be the value of physical capital of
the banking system operating under unlimited liability. A competitive equilibrium is
a pair of interest rates (rd∗, r
c
∗) such that the following conditions hold:
E
[
G(·, d1, r
d
∗, r
c
∗)
]
= [d1 + k1] (1 + rE) (7)
Π (i∗, r
c
∗) = W (1 + rE) (8)[
η − i∗
]
I = S + d1 (9)
rd∗ ≤ rE (10)
Equation (7) is the free exit and free entry condition. If the expected return on equity
were lower than rE, banks would exit and not offer their intermediation services. If
the expected return were higher, new banks would enter until the expected return is
again rE. Condition (7) also rules out that banks will finance entrepreneurs and do
not simply invest all of their funds in the risk-less alternative investment opportunity.
Indeed if physical capital k1 is sufficiently high, then
E[G(·, d1, r
d
∗, r
c
∗)] ≥ d1(1 + rE) + S(rE − r
d
∗). (11)
Moreover Corollary 1 below shows that (11) also implies rc∗ ≥ rE, so that bank owners
obtain a non-negative risk premium on equity. Equation (8) is the indifference condition
for the critical quality level i∗, which determines the demand for loans. Equation (9)
is the equilibrium condition for savings and investments at banks given in (3), showing
that the critical entrepreneur i∗ = i∗(d1) defined in (2) is independent of interest rates.
In equilibrium all entrepreneurs with sufficiently high quality parameters i ≥ i∗ invest in
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their production projects, while all entrepreneurs with insufficient quality parameters
i < i∗ invest in the alternative project. The last condition (10) requires that bank
equity holders and entrepreneurs who invest in the alternative project are not worse
off than by depositing the money at banks.
The banking system operates under unlimited liability in the sense that banks (or
their bank managers) internalize the default risk that would materialize in losses. This
assumption can be justified in various ways. For instance, the non-pecuniary cost of
defaults for managers can induce banks to behave as if they were maximizing expected
profits. Alternatively, we might consider a banking system that operates under limited
liability. Then the l.h.s. of (7) would have to be replaced by
E
[
max{G(·, d1, r
d, rc), 0}
]
.
For sufficiently small default probabilities of a bank, both formulations should yield the
same qualitative results. Finally, we note how the equilibrium conditions have to be
adjusted when there are fixed costs for monitoring loans. Suppose a bank has granted
a loan with a face value of I and needs to spend m ≥ 0 units of resources to secure the
liquidation value of defaulting entrepreneurs. Then the free exit and entry condition
needs to be reformulated as
E
[
G(·, d1, r
d
∗, r
c
∗)
]
−
[
η − i∗
]
I m = [d1 + k1] (1 + rE).
3.2 Existence of competitive equilibria
Since savings S are independent of deposit rates, the establishment of the existence
and uniqueness of a competitive equilibrium is straightforward. We obtain
Proposition 1
Let d1 ∈ [0, d] with i∗ = i∗(d1) be arbitrary. Suppose, in addition, that the following
conditions hold:
(i) The ratio between physical capital and savings satisfies k1
S
≥ rE
1+rE
.
(ii) Entrepreneur i∗ invests for a zero loan interest rate, i.e., Π(i∗, 0) > W (1 + rE).
(iii) Productivity of entrepreneurs is such that
E[q]
∫ η
i∗
(1 + i)f di ≤ [d1 + k1 + S](1 + rE).
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Then a simple banking system admits a unique competitive equilibrium {rd∗, r
c
∗}, where
rd∗ = r
d
∗(i∗, rE) and r
c
∗ = r
c
∗(i∗, rE) are given by
Π
(
i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
= W (1 + rE)
and
rd∗(i∗, rE) =
1
S
{
E
[
P
(
·, i∗, r
c
∗
)]
− [d1 + k1](1 + rE)
}
− 1, (12)
respectively.
Corollary 1
The loan interest rate satisfies rc∗ = r
c
∗(i∗, rE) ≥ rE and is increasing in rE.
The proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 is given in the appendix. Condition (i)
of Proposition 1 is a sufficient condition that it is attractive for banks to finance en-
trepreneurs, whereas Condition (ii) ensures that entrepreneurs apply for loans. Condi-
tion (iii) states that the largest possible expected aggregate liquidation value is lower
than the return on all available funds. It is a sufficient condition to guarantee that
the last equilibrium condition (10) holds. Note that the equilibrium loan interest rate
rc∗ in Proposition 1 is independent of physical capital k1, whereas the equilibrium de-
posit interest rate is not. Throughout this paper we will suppress this dependency for
notational simplicity. Note also that the existence results holds for any value of i∗ if
Π(0, 0) > W (1 + rE).
To obtain further insight into the nature of equilibrium interest rates, together with
their associated risk premia, consider the aggregate losses of the banking system in
equilibrium. Using (4), these are formally defined by
L(q, i∗, rE) := [η − i∗]I
[
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE)
]
− P
(
q, i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
(13)
=
∫ η
i∗
max
{
I
[
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE)
]
− q(1 + i)f , 0
}
di.
Expected aggregate losses in equilibrium are
L(i∗, rE) := E
[
L(·, i∗, rE)
]
(14)
= [η − i∗]I
[
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE)
]
− E
[
P
(
·, i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)]
.
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Inserting (12) into (6) and using (13) and (14), the bank capital of a simple banking
system in the second period is
d2 = G∗(q, d1, rE) := G(q, d1, r
d
∗, r
c
∗)
= P
(
q, i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
− E
[
P
(
·, i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)]
+ e1(1 + rE)
= L(i∗, rE)− L(q, i∗, rE) + e1 + e1rE, (15)
where e1 = d1 +k1 as before. Equation (15) is a compact representation of bank capital
at the end of the intermediation process. Future capital is equal to initial equity plus the
interest earned on equity plus the difference between expected and realized aggregate
losses. On the basis of Proposition 1, the interest-rate margin is given as
∆ = ∆(i∗, rE) := r
c
∗ − r
d
∗ =
1
S
[
L(i∗, rE) + d1(rE − r
c
∗) + k1(1 + rE)
]
. (16)
The interest-rate margin consists of three terms. The first term L(i∗,rE)
S
represents
the premium for macroeconomic risks and is equal to expected losses per unit of de-
posits. If there is no macroeconomic risk, the term is zero. The second term d1(rE−r
c
∗
)
S
represents the additional cost of equity, i.e., the differential between return on equity
and equilibrium loan-interest rate. The third term describes the return if the physical
capital were liquidated.
3.3 Properties of competitive equilibria
In this section, we derive some intuitive characteristics of competitive equilibria in
simple banking systems. Observe first that an entrepreneur with quality level i enters
bankruptcy if he is unable to fully pay back his credit, that is, if
I
(
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE)
)
> q(1 + i)f.
The entrepreneur with the lowest quality level who is not bankrupt after encountering
the shock q is given by
iB = iB(q, rE) :=

I
(
1 + rc∗(rE)
)
qf
− 1 if qTB(rE) ≤ q < qNB(rE),
i∗(rE) if q ≥ qNB(rE),
(17)
where
qNB(rE) :=
I
[
1 + rc∗(rE)
][
1 + i∗(rE)
]
f
and qTB(rE) :=
I
(
1 + rc∗(rE)
)
(1 + η)f
. (18)
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If shocks are sufficiently positive q ≥ qNB(rE), then no firm goes bankrupt and ag-
gregate losses of banks are zero. For shocks qTB(rE) ≤ q < qNB(rE), all investing
entrepreneurs with quality levels i∗ < i < iB(q, rE) enter bankruptcy, whereas en-
trepreneurs with quality levels i ≥ iB(q, rE) pay back their loans fully. On the other
hand, all entrepreneurs will enter bankruptcy if q < qTB(rE) and losses are maximal.
3.4 Instability
In this section we investigate conditions under which the banking system becomes
unstable. In particular, we determine the default probability for the banking system,
that is, the probability of negative bank capital d2. An individual bank goes bankrupt
if d2
n
< 0. Due to the assumed symmetry of banks, this is equivalent to the condition
d2 = G(d1, q, r
d
∗, r
c
∗) < 0, stating that the whole banking system is bankrupt. Using
(15), this condition takes the form
e1(1 + rE) < L(q, i∗, rE)− L(i∗, rE). (19)
The banking system will collapse if actual aggregate losses exceed expected aggregate
losses by more than the return on equity. Equation (24) implies that a necessary
condition for the default of a bank is q < qNB(i∗, rE). The default probability for banks
can now be determined as follows:
Proposition 2
Let d1 ∈ [0, d] be arbitrary and assume that
e1(1 + rE) < L(q, i∗, rE)− L(i∗, rE).
Then there exists a unique critical level q ≤ qcrit ≤ qNB(i∗, rE) for macroeconomic
shocks, such that the banking system defaults if and only if q < qcrit. The default
probability is
Πdefault := Prob
(
e1(1 + rE) < L(q, i∗, rE)− L(i∗, rE)
)
=
∫ qcrit
q
h(q)dq. (20)
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix. Note that the condition
e1(1 + rE) < L(q, i∗, rE)− L(i∗, rE).
depends on the endogenous variable rc∗. By inserting the equilibrium function r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
and by setting i∗ =
d−d1
I
, this condition can be expressed solely in terms of exogenous
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parameters. Proposition 2 shows that banks will default with positive probability as
soon as the buffer e1(1 + rE) is too small to insure against adverse macroeconomic
shocks.
The equation (20) is a value-at-risk formula for the banking system and for an individual
bank. It can also be used to determine the level of capital necessary to limit the
default risk of the banking system. Suppose that Πdefault is predetermined by banking
regulation. Then equation (20) determines the required level of bank capital, i.e., the
value of e1 such that the default risk equals Πdefault.
3.5 Uniformly distributed shocks
To derive more tractable results and to obtain explicit loan-interest rates, we will
assume that the macroeconomic productivity shocks are uniformly distributed. The
following lemma gives explicit interest rates for this case.
Lemma 1
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 1, assume that the macroeconomic shocks are
uniformly distributed such that h(q) := 1
q−q
. Then the competitive loan-interest rate
takes the form
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE) =

(1+i∗)f
I
[
q −
√
2(q−q)W
(1+i∗)f
(1 + rE)
]
if 1 + rE ≤
(1+i∗)f
W
(
q−q
2
)
,
(1+i∗)f
I
(
q+q
2
)
− W
I
(1 + rE) otherwise.
(21)
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the appendix. As seen above, bankruptcies only
occur with positive probability if qNB(i∗, rE) > q. Inserting the loan-interest rate (21),
we see that this is the case if and only if the alternative project’s rate of return 1 + rE
satisfies
1 + rE ≤
(1+i∗)f
2W
(q − q). (22)
Note that condition (22) is expressed solely in terms of exogenous parameters if we
replace i∗ with
d−d1
I
. A situation where all entrepreneurs go bankrupt does not occur
if qTB(i∗, rE) < q. Inserting the loan-interest rate (21), this will be the case if and only
if the rate of return 1 + rE of the alternative project satisfies
1 + rE ≥
(1+i∗)f
2W
(
q − 1+η
1+i∗
q
)
. (23)
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To allow for bankruptcies of firms but excluding the extreme case that all firms may
go bankrupt, we assume for the remainder of the paper that both conditions (22) and
(23) hold.
Solving the integral in (13), aggregate losses in equilibrium L = L(i∗, q, rE) under the
hypothesis of Lemma 1 and the assumption that qTB(i∗, rE) ≤ q take the form
L =
0 if q ≥ qNB(i∗, rE),(1+i∗)2f
2q
[qNB(i∗, rE)− q]
2 if q ≤ q < qNB(i∗, rE).
(24)
Expected losses due to bankruptcies of firms in an equilibrium take the form
L(i∗, rE) =
qNB∫
q
(1+i∗)2f
2q
[qNB − q]
2 dq
(q−q)
(25)
=
(1 + i∗)
2 f
2(q − q)
{
q2NB ln
(
qNB
q
)
− 2qNB(qNB − q) +
1
2
(q2NB − q
2)
}
,
where qNB = qNB(i∗, rE).
We are now in a position to undertake some comparative statics analyses. First of all,
we can clearly see that the equilibrium loan-interest rate (21) is decreasing in rE. For
the interest-rate margin we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3
Under the hypotheses of Lemma 1, let {rd∗(i∗, rE), r
c
∗(i∗, rE)} be a competitive equilib-
rium of the simple banking system, where
(1+i∗)f
2W
(
q − 1+η
1+i∗
q
)
≤ 1 + rE ≤
(1+i∗)f
2W
(q − q).
If the value of physical capital k1 is sufficiently small and
qNB(0, rE) ln
(
qNB(0,rE)
q
)
−
[
qNB(0, rE)− q
]
q − q
<
d
I
,
then dcrit ∈ [0, d] exists such that
∂∆
∂rE
(i∗, rE) ≤ 0 if d1 ∈ [0, dcrit] and
∂∆
∂rE
(i∗, rE) > 0 if d1 ∈ (dcrit, d].
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix. Proposition 3 implies that higher
returns on equity in other investment opportunities influence interest-rate margins
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through different channels. On the one hand, a higher value of rE lowers loan-interest
rates (and deposit rates), as entrepreneurs have better alternatives for investing their
equity. This lowers banks’ expected lending losses, which in turn tends to decrease
risk premia. On the other hand, bank owners will demand higher expected returns on
bank equity, which in turn requires larger intermediation margins. For a small amount
of bank capital the former effect dominates. For a level of bank capital above dcrit the
relative importance of the effects is reversed.
The default probability for uniformly distributed shocks takes the following explicit
form:
Corollary 2
Under the hypotheses of Lemma 1, the default probability is
Πdefault =
qcrit − q
q − q
,
where the critical level is given by
qcrit = qNB(i∗, rE) + A(i∗, rE)−
√(
qNB(i∗, rE) + A(i∗, rE)
)2
− q2NB(i∗, rE) (26)
with A(i∗, rE) :=
1
(1+i∗)2f
[
L(i∗, rE) + e1(1 + rE)
]
.
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the appendix. Observe that qcrit depends essentially
on rE and e1.
The preceding results have enabled us to characterize the default probability of the
banking system in terms of the underlying exogenous parameters and distributions. In
the next section we carry out the same exercise for a sophisticated banking system.
4 Competitive Equilibria for Sophisticated Banks
4.1 Equilibrium concept
We turn to the other polar case in which banks are sophisticated in their rating abilities
so that they are able to detect the quality level i of an individual entrepreneur. They
can thus determine the firm-specific default probability. The key idea of the equilibrium
concept for sophisticated banks is to require that banks charge a fair risk premium in
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the sense that the average return on each loan is equal to the risk-free return on equity.
Let
R(i, rci ) =
q∫
q
min {q(1 + i)f, I(1 + rci )} h(q)dq (27)
denote the expected repayment by an entrepreneur with quality level i who has received
a loan with the face value I at the interest rate rci . In requiring banks to earn the same
return on each investing entrepreneur means that an individualized interest rate rci for
entrepreneur i has to be such that
R
(
i, rci
) !
= R
(
i∗, r
c
i∗
)
(28)
for all investing entrepreneurs i ∈ [i∗, η]. Let di1 and Si1 denote the amount of equity
and deposits used to finance a loan of size I. As we assume that the debt/equity ratio
is the same across loans, we have
di1 =
d
η − io
and Si1 =
S
η − io
for each entrepreneur i who invests into her production project.6 As all banks must
pay the deposit interest rate rd on deposits Si1, the individual return of a producing
entrepreneur i must be at least
R
(
i, rci
)
≥
1
[η − io]
[
d1(1 + rE) + S(1 + r
d)
]
so that banks will offer their intermediation services.
The equilibrium concept for a sophisticated banking system is modified as follows. A
competitive equilibrium for a sophisticated banking system is a list of deposit- and
loan-interest rates
{
rdo∗ ,
{
rco∗i
}
i∈[i∗,η]
}
such that
(i) no banks exit and no banks enter the market to offer intermediation services,
(ii) firms take optimal investment decisions,
(iii) loan demand equals loan supply.
More formally, a competitive equilibrium with financial intermediation for a sophisti-
cated banking system is defined as follows:
6This corresponds to the capital requirements in the first Basel Accord.
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Definition 2
Suppose d1 ∈ [0, d], k1 ≥ 0, and rE ≥ 0 be arbitrary. A sophisticated (competitive)
equilibrium in a sophisticated banking system is a list
{
rdo∗ ,
{
rco∗ (i)
}
i∈[i∗,η]
}
consisting
of a deposit-interest rate rdo∗ and loan-interest rates r
co
∗i = r
co
∗ (i), such that
[η − i∗]R
(
i, rco∗ (i)
)
= [d1 + k1](1 + rE) + S(1 + r
do
∗ ), i ∈ [i∗, η], (29)
Π
(
i∗, r
co
∗ (i∗)
)
= W (1 + rE), (30)[
η − i∗
]
I = S + d1, (31)
rdo∗ ≤ rE. (32)
The equilibrium notion derives naturally from the corresponding Definition 1 for a
simple banking system. Condition (29) states that banks must earn the same expected
return on each loan. Recalling that Π(i, rc) is increasing in quality levels i, condition
(30) is the indifference condition for entrepreneurs. As before, (31) is the equilibrium
condition for savings and investments at banks determining the critical entrepreneur
i∗ = i∗(d1), which is the same as in the simple banking system. In a sophisticated
equilibrium all entrepreneurs with sufficiently high quality parameters i ≥ i∗ invest in
their production projects, while all entrepreneurs with insufficient quality parameters
i < i∗ invest in the alternative project. Hence, both systems finance the same number
of production projects. Finally, the last condition precludes that entrepreneurs who
invest in the alternative project and bank equity holders do not want to deposit their
money at banks.
Condition (29) is equivalent to the free exit and free entry condition, as a bank that
offers its intermediation service for entrepreneurs will earn an expected return on equity
of 1+rE if it employs
d1+k1
η−i∗
as equity and S
η−i∗
as deposits to perform the intermediation
services and to fund an individual borrower. To verify that no banks exit or enter a
sophisticated banking system in equilibrium, we proceed as follows. The repayments
to banks in a sophisticated banking system are
P o(q, i∗, rE) =
∫ η
i∗
min
{
q(1 + i)f, I
[
1 + rco∗ (i)
]}
di. (33)
Using equations (27) and (28) which must hold in equilibrium, the expected repayments
in a sophisticated equilibrium are given by:
E
[
P o(·, i∗, rE)
]
= [η − i∗]R
(
i∗, r
co
∗ (i∗)
)
. (34)
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Using (29), future bank capital of the sophisticated system in equilibrium is
do2 = G
o
∗(q, d1, rE) := P
o(q, i∗, rE) − S
[
1 + rdo∗ (i∗)
]
= P o(q, i∗, rE)− E
[
P o(·, i∗)
]
+ e1(1 + rE), (35)
where i∗ = i∗(d1) as before. Thus
E [Go∗(·, d1, rE)] = e1(1 + rE)
and the free exit and free entry condition is satisfied in equilibrium.
4.2 Existence of sophisticated equilibria
To establish existence and uniqueness of sophisticated equilibria, observe that i∗ is
again equal to d−d1
I
. Condition (30) implies that, in a sophisticated equilibrium, the
entrepreneur with the lowest quality level i∗ must be indifferent between applying for
loans and investing in the alternative project at the rate rE, i.e., Π(i∗, r
co
∗i∗
) = W (1+rE).
This condition coincides with the indifference condition (8) for simple banks. Using
Proposition 1, we obtain
Lemma 2
Suppose Π(i∗, 0) > W (1 + rE) for some d1 ∈ [0, d] with i∗ = i∗(d1). Then the interest
rate for the lowest-quality entrepreneur applying for loans is given by
rco∗i∗ = r
c
∗(i∗, rE), (36)
where rc∗(i∗, rE) is implicitly defined by
Π
(
i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
= W (1 + rE).
Lemma 2 shows that the loan-interest rate for the lowest-quality entrepreneur in the
sophisticated system coincides with the loan-interest rate in the simple system. Setting
R∗(i∗, rE) := R
(
i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
for the average repayment of the lowest-quality entrepreneur in equilibrium, we are
now ready to establish existence and uniqueness of sophisticated equilibria.
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Proposition 4
Let d1 ∈ [0, d] with i∗ = i∗(d1) be arbitrary and suppose that the following conditions
hold.
(i) The ratio between physical capital and savings satisfies k1
S
≥ rE
1+rE
.
(ii) Entrepreneur i∗ invests for a loan interest rate rE, i.e., Π(i∗, 0) > W (1 + rE).
(iii) Productivity of entrepreneurs is such that
E[q]
∫ η
i∗
(1 + i)f di ≤ [d1 + k1 + S](1 + rE).
If
R(η, 0) ≤ R∗(i∗, rE), (37)
then a sophisticated banking system admits a unique sophisticated equilibrium{
rdo∗ , {r
co
∗i}i∈[i∗,η]
}
,
where rdo∗ = r
do
∗ (i∗, rE) and r
co
∗i = r
co
∗ (i, rE), i ∈ [i∗, η] are defined by
rdo∗ (i∗, rE) =
1
S
{
[η − i∗]R∗(i∗, rE)− [d1 + k1](1 + rE)
}
− 1 (38)
and
R
(
i, rco∗ (i, rE)
)
= R∗(i∗, rE), i ∈ [i∗, η], (39)
respectively.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. Conditions (i)-(iii) are completely
analogous to those of Proposition 1. The additional Condition (37) requires that a
sophisticated banking system is capable of lowering the loan interest such that banks
earn the same expected repayment R∗(i∗, rE) on loans for all entrepreneurs i ≥ i∗
who invest in their production projects. Note that the equilibrium loan interest rates
rco∗ (i, rE) in Proposition 4 are independent of physical capital k1, whereas the equi-
librium deposit interest rate rdo∗ is not. Throughout this paper we will suppress this
dependency for notational simplicity.
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4.3 Properties of sophisticated equilibria
Let
∆o(i, rE) := r
co
∗ (i, rE)− r
do
∗ (i∗, rE)
denote the equilibrium intermediation margin associated with the investment project
of entrepreneur i. We first obtain the following comparative statics result.
Lemma 3
Let the assumptions of Proposition 4 be satisfied. Then for each i ∈ (i∗, η), the following
is true:
(i)
∂rco∗
∂i
(i, rE) ≤ 0, (ii)
∂rco∗
∂rE
(i, rE) < 0,
(iii)
∂∆o
∂rE
(i, rE) > 0 if
S
[η − i∗]
<
∂R
∂rc
(
i, rco∗ (i, rE)
)
or if d1 + k1 is sufficiently high.
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in the appendix. The first property in Lemma 3 is
clear. The second property is explained by the feedback of rE on the loan-interest
rates. A higher rE leads to lower r
co
∗ (i∗, rE) and thus to lower expected repayments to
banks by all entrepreneurs, which implies (ii). Analogously to Proposition 3, a rising
rE has countervailing effects on interest rate margins which depends on parameters.
For a sufficiently large level of equity of deposits, interest margins will again rise if the
return on equity rises.
An immediate corollary to Lemma 3 is that entrepreneurs whose bankruptcy risk is zero
so that their average repayments are equal to their obligations pay the same interest
rate. This observation is stated as follows.
Corollary 3
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4, suppose there exists a quality level iNB ∈ [i∗, η]
such that
R
(
iNB, r
co
∗ (iNB, rE)
)
= I
(
1 + rco∗ (iNB, rE)
)
.
Then all entrepreneurs with sufficiently high quality parameters i ∈ [iNB, η] pay the
same loan interest rates which is given by
1 + rco∗ (i, rE) =
R∗(i∗, rE)
I
.
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The corollary shows that a sophisticated banking system provides a floor R∗(i∗,rE)
I
for
the loan-interest rates. All entrepreneurs who meet their obligations with certainty
will pay the interest rate given by the floor. All other entrepreneurs pay a higher loan-
interest rate. For these entrepreneurs the loan-interest rate is monotonically decreasing
with the quality of their investment projects.
4.4 Instability
As with simple banking, we are now in a position to derive the default probability of
an individual bank, which is equal to the probability of a system-wide collapse of the
banking system. Aggregate losses of the sophisticated system are formally defined by
Lo(q, i∗, rE) =
∫ η
i∗
I
[
1 + rco∗ (i, rE)
]
di − P o(q, i∗, rE) (40)
Using (39), expected aggregate losses are
Lo(i∗, rE) := E
[
Lo(·, i∗, rE)
]
=
∫ η
i∗
I
[
1 + rco∗ (i, rE)
]
di − [η − i∗]R∗(i∗, rE). (41)
Inserting (38) and (41) into (35) yields
do2 = L
o(i∗, rE)− L
o(q, i∗, rE) + e1(1 + rE) (42)
with e1 = d1 +k1. Given the symmetry assumption of this paper, the default condition
for an individual bank coincides with the default condition for the whole banking
system and is do2 < 0. Using (42) this condition takes the form
e1(1 + rE) < L
o(q, i∗, rE)− L
o(i∗, rE). (43)
Again, the banking system will collapse if actual aggregate losses are higher than
expected aggregate losses plus return on equity. Equation (24) demonstrates that a
necessary condition for the default of a bank is q < qNB(i∗, rE). It follows from (40)
that Lo(q, i∗, rE) is decreasing in q. Therefore, the proof of the following proposition is
analogous to that of Proposition 2.
Proposition 5
Let d1 ∈ [0, d] and k1 > 0 be arbitrary and assume that
e1(1 + rE) < L
o(q, i∗, rE)− L
o(i∗, rE),
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where e1 = d1 + k1. Then there exists a unique critical level q < q
o
crit < qNB(i∗, rE) for
macroeconomic shocks, such that a sophisticated banking system will default if and
only if q < qocrit. The default probability is
Πodefault := Prob
(
e1(1 + rE) < L
o(q, i∗, rE)− L
o(i∗, rE)
)
=
∫ qo
crit
q
h(q)dq. (44)
Proposition 5 states that banks default with positive probability as soon as the buffer
e1(1+ rE) is too small to insure against adverse macroeconomic shocks. As in the case
of simple banking, equation (44) is a value-at-risk formula. Indeed, if the default prob-
ability is stipulated at a certain value Πodefault, equation (44) determines the required
equity level e1 = d1 + k1 such that an individual bank and hence the banking system
defaults with probability Πodefault.
4.5 Uniformly distributed shocks
Assume that the shocks are uniformly distributed on [q, q]. Setting r(i) = (1+i)qf/I−1
and r(i) = (1+ i)qf/I− 1, the expected repayment of entrepreneur i, given an interest
rate rc, is
R(i, rc) =

I(1 + rc) if rc < r(i),
1
q−q
{
qI(1 + rc)− I
2(1+rc)2
2(1+i)f
− 1
2
q2(1 + i)f
}
if r(i) ≤ rc ≤ r(i),
q+q
2
(1 + i)f if r(i) < rc.
(45)
Inserting the loan interest function given by Lemma 1 into (45) and using the fact that
loan-interest rates of both banking systems coincide for the lowest-quality entrepreneur
as in Lemma 2, we obtain
R∗(i∗, rE) = R
(
i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
=
q+q
2
(1 + i∗)f −W (1 + rE). (46)
From condition (39) we may solve R(i, rco∗i ) = R∗(i∗, rE) for r
co
∗i for each investing
entrepreneurs i, to obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 4
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4, assume that the macroeconomic shocks are
uniformly distributed such that h(q) := 1
q−q
. Then the deposit-interest rate takes the
form
1 + rdo∗ (i∗, rE) =
1
S
{
[η − i∗]
q+q
2
(1 + i∗)f −
(
[η − i∗]W + e1
)
(1 + rE)
}
. (47)
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The loan-interest rates of sophisticated banking equilibrium are given by7
1 + rco∗ (i, rE) =

R∗(i∗,rE)
I
if 1 + rE ≥
(1+i∗)f
W
[
q+q
2
−
(
1+i
1+i∗
)
q
]
,
(1+i)f
I
[
q −
√
i−i∗
1+i
(q2 − q2) +
2(q−q)W
(1+i)f
(1 + rE)
]
otherwise,
(48)
where i ∈ [i∗, η].
Lemma 4 implies that loan-interest rates are either independent of the quality of en-
trepreneurs i [first branch of equation (48)] or decreasing with i (second branch of
equation (48)). The first case will occur if the return rE on outside investments is
sufficiently high in relation to the quality of the entrepreneur. The following corollary
is analogous to Corollary 2.
Corollary 4
If, in addition, the shocks are uniformly distributed, then the default probability is
Πodefault =
qocrit − q
q − q
.
5 Comparison of the Two Systems
5.1 Market conditions
For comparison of the two banking systems, let us first focus on the interest rates.
Consider the highly ideal case in which no firm bankruptcies occur in the simple banking
system. This will occur if
q(1 + i∗)f ≥ I
[
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE)
]
.
Average repayments of entrepreneurs are then
R
(
i, rc∗(i∗, rE)
)
= I
[
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE)
]
for all i ∈ [i∗, η]
and by virtue of Proposition 4 we have
rco∗ (i, rE) = r
c
∗(i∗, rE) for all i ∈ [i∗, η],
7Note that only the smaller solution of the quadratic equation is economically viable.
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implying that the simple and the sophisticated banking system have the same loan-
interest rates and the same deposit-interest rates.
This situation changes as soon as firm bankruptcies occur in equilibrium. The following
proposition shows that loan- and deposit-interest rates in a sophisticated system are
lower than loan- and deposit-interest rates in a simple banking system.
Proposition 6
Under the hypotheses of Propositions 1 and 4 assume that
q(1 + i∗)f < I
[
1 + rc∗(i∗, rE)
]
and that firm bankruptcies occur with positive probability. Then the following holds:
(i) rc∗(i∗, rE) > r
co
∗ (i, rE) for all i > i∗ with equality holding for i = i∗,
(ii) rd∗(i∗, rE) > r
do
∗ (i∗, rE).
The intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. In a sophisticated banking system, banks
tailor loan-interest rates to the quality level of entrepreneurs. All entrepreneurs with
i > i∗ obtain lower loan-interest rates in a sophisticated banking system than in a
simple banking system. In order to generate equity returns of 1 + rE, deposit rates in
a sophisticated system must be lower than in a simple banking system, i.e., rdo∗ < r
d
∗.
5.2 Default
We next analyze the conditions under which a simple banking system accumulates
more capital than a sophisticated system. Recall that the expected bank capital in
both banking systems is the same and equal to e1(1 + rE). The banking system with
lower bank capital will be less likely to collapse if macroeconomic shocks are adverse.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 6 is that repayments to simple banks are
higher than repayments to sophisticated banks, such that
P
(
q, i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
≥ P o(q, i∗, rE). (49)
The critical shock below which entrepreneur i will go bankrupt in the sophisticated
system is denoted by qoNB(i, rE), such that entrepreneur i is bankrupt for all shocks
q ≤ qoNB(i, rE) :=
I
[
1 + rco∗ (i, rE)
]
(1 + i)f
.
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Since rco∗ (i, rE) < r
c
∗(i∗, rE) for i > i∗, we have
qoNB(i∗, rE) < qNB(i∗, rE) for all i > i∗
with equality holding for the critical entrepreneur i = i∗. Hence the default risk of
an individual entrepreneur is lower in a sophisticated system. Observe that (49) holds
with a strict inequality for all shocks q ≥ qoNB(η, rE). This means that repayments
to simple banks are higher provided the macroeconomic environment is sufficiently
favorable. This scenario occurs with positive probability if qoNB(η, rE) < q.
In order to compare the banking systems’ capabilities to accumulate capital, recall that
future bank capital of the simple banking system is determined by
d2 = G∗(q, d1, rE)
with G∗ given in (15), while the future bank capital of a sophisticated system is deter-
mined by
do2 = G
o
∗(q, d1, rE)
with Go∗ given in (42). Given the same initial equity level e1 = d1 + k1 and the same
interest rate rE, it follows from (15) and (42) that d
o
2 ≥ d2 if and only if
L(q, i∗, rE)− L(i∗, rE) ≥ L
o(q, i∗, rE)− L
o(i∗, rE). (50)
The following proposition shows that the sophisticated banking system will accumulate
more bank capital than the simple system for all shocks below a certain ‘break-even’
value qBE. As a consequence, a sophisticated system is better able to cope with highly
adverse shocks than a simple system. The reverse is true for positive shocks when a
simple system will accumulate more bank capital.
Proposition 7
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 6, assume that q < qoNB(i∗, rE) < q, such that in
both banking systems high-quality entrepreneurs meet their obligations with positive
probability while at the same time bankruptcies are possible in both systems. Then
there exists a critical shock qBE = qBE(i∗, rE) ∈ (q, q), such that the sophisticated
banking system outperforms the simple system for all shocks q ≤ qBE. More precisely,
Go∗(q, d1, rE) ≥ G∗(q, d1, rE) if and only if q ≤ qBE.
26
The proof of Proposition 7 is given in the appendix. To illustrate this result, consider
an extreme case in which all firms go bankrupt, causing a default of the sophisticated
banking system. Such an adverse macroeconomic shock means that all firms will be
bankrupt under a simple banking system as well. Since banks earn only the liquidation
values, revenues in both banking systems are identical in this case. However, deposit
rates are higher in a simple banking system, so their aggregate losses are higher. This
explains the lower bank capital for a simple banking system if macroeconomic shocks
are below the critical level qBE.
Our main theorem now shows that the default probability of the banking system de-
pends highly on their capital base.
Theorem 1
Let the hypotheses of Proposition 7 be satisfied.
(i) If
Go∗(qBE, d1, rE) = G∗(qBE, d1, rE) > 0, (51)
then the default probability of the sophisticated banking system is lower than
the default probability of the simple banking system, i.e., Πodefault < Πdefault.
(ii) If, on the contrary,
Go∗(qBE, d1, rE) = G∗(qBE, d1, rE) < 0, (52)
then the default probability of the sophisticated banking system is higher than
the default probability of the simple banking system, i.e. Πodefault > Πdefault.
In view of (15), Condition (51) is clearly satisfied if initial equity e1 is sufficiently high.
To illustrate Result (i) of Theorem 1, suppose a sufficiently adverse macroeconomic
shock occurs. Although loan-interest rates are higher in a simple banking system, rev-
enues do not fully reflect the interest rate differentials with respect to the sophisticated
banking system, as under both systems banks will only earn liquidation values for a
substantial set of entrepreneurs. However, simple banks face higher refinancing costs
rd∗ > r
do
∗ which are unaffected by a macroeconomic shock. Hence, simple banks are
more likely to default than sophisticated banks when sufficiently adverse shocks occur.
On the other hand, (51) may be violated for a low level of initial equity e1. Then
banks may default if moderate adverse macroeconomic shocks and a small number of
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firm bankruptcies occur. In this case, a simple banking system has greater benefits
from higher average loan rates, which may outweigh the higher refinancing costs in
comparison to a sophisticated system. While entrepreneurs benefit from lower loan
interest rates in the sophisticated system, the system itself may lack a sufficient amount
of repayments. As a consequence, sophistication may decrease bank stability.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrated that more sophistication in the assessment of individual de-
fault risks of entrepreneurs will only increase banking stability if initial equity is suffi-
ciently high. We showed that sophistication in risk management rewards high-quality
entrepreneurs with lower loan rates at the expense of depositors facing lower returns.
Sophistication in rating techniques thus has distributional implications for both sides of
the market. Our analysis suggests that regulatory policies for banking such as Basel II
which require banks to introduce more sophistication in assessing the credit worthiness
their clients will only be beneficial if banks are sufficiently healthy in terms of equity.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
It is easy to check that Condition (i) implies that (11) holds. Set rc := q(1+η)f
I
− 1 with
q denoting the highest possible shock. Then the expected profits of any entrepreneur
i are zero for loan rates higher than rc , i.e., Π(i, rc) = 0 for rc ≥ rc with Π given
in (1). Since Π(i, rc) is increasing in quality levels i ∈ [0, η] and strictly decreasing
with loan interest rates rc ∈ [0, rc], the indifference equation (8) has a unique solution
rc∗ = r
c
∗(i∗, rE) ∈ [0, r
c] if Condition (ii) holds, i.e., Π(i∗, rE) > W (1 + rE) . Inserting
(6) into the no-entry condition (7) and solving for rd∗, we can calculate the equilibrium
deposit rate rd∗ as a function of i∗ and rE. Since
E
[
P (·, i∗, r
c
∗)
]
≤ E
[
P (·, i∗, r
c)
]
= E[q]
∫ η
i∗
(1 + i)f di
Condition (iii) implies (10). This proves the proposition.
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Proof of Lemma 1.
Notice first that
E
[
P (·, i∗, r
c
∗)
]
≤ [η − i∗]I(1 + r
c
∗)
Suppose on the contrary that rc∗ < rE. It follows from (11) and (9) that
E
[
P (·, i∗, r
c
∗)
]
≥ [η − i∗]I(1 + rE),
a contradiction. The rest follows from the implicit function theorem.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Setting r(i∗) = (1 + i∗)qf/I − 1 and r(i∗) = (1 + i∗)qf/I − 1, the expected profit of
entrepreneur i∗ given an interest rate r
c is
Π(i∗, r
c) =

(1 + i∗)f
q+q
2
− I(1 + rc) if rc < r(i∗),
(1+i∗)f
2(q−q)
[
q − I(1+r
c)
(1+i∗)f
]2
if r(i∗) ≤ r
c ≤ r(i∗),
0 if r(i∗) < r
c.
Then (21) follows from condition (8) when we observe that in the resulting quadratic
equation for rc∗(i∗, rE) only the smaller solution is economically viable.
Proof of Proposition 2.
By assumption, we have d2 = G(q, d1, r
d
∗, r
c
∗) < 0. Since G(q, d1, r
d
∗, r
c
∗) > 0 for q ≥
qNB(i∗, r
c
∗) and the function G is strictly increasing in q, there exists a unique critical
shock q < qcrit < qNB(i∗, rE) such that G(qcrit, d1, r
d
∗, r
c
∗) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let i∗ = i∗(d1), as before, and observe first that (25) is composed of two functions
such that L(i∗, rE) = L˜
(
i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
for a suitably defined function L˜. Differentiation
∆(i∗, rE) with respect to rE yields
∂∆
∂rE
(i∗, rE) =
1
S
([
∂L˜
∂rc
(
i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
− d1
]
∂rc∗
∂rE
(i∗, rE) + d1 + k1
)
. (53)
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We have
∂rc∗
∂rE
(i∗, rE) < 0 and
∂L˜
∂rc
(i∗, r
c
∗) = I(1 + i∗)
qNB(i∗, rE) ln
(
qNB(i∗,rE)
q
)
− (qNB(i∗, rE)− q)
q − q
≥ 0.
This implies that the bracket in (53) is positive for d1 equal or close to zero. Hence,
(53) is negative for sufficiently small d1 + k1.
On the other hand, the bracket in (53) is negative by assumption for d1 = d noting
that 0 = i∗(d). Thus, (53) is positive for d1 sufficiently close to d. Provided that
k1 is sufficiently small, the existence of dcrit then follows from the intermediate value
theorem and by
d
dd1
(
∂L˜
∂rc
(i∗, r
c
∗)
)
< 1 and
d
dd1
(
∂rc∗
∂rE
(i∗, rE)
)
> 0.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Under the hypothesis of Lemma 1, the condition G(d1, qcrit, r
d
∗, r
c
∗) = 0 is equivalent to
L(i∗, rE) + e1(1 + rE)−
(1 + i∗)
2f
2q
[qNB(i∗, rE)− q]
2 = 0
or, with the help of the notation introduced in the main text,
q2 − 2
(
qNB(i∗, rE) + A(i∗, rE)
)
q + q2NB(i∗, rE) = 0. (54)
The unique solution of (54) lying in
(
q, qNB(i∗, rE)
)
is the critical level qcrit given in
(26).
Proof of Proposition 4.
The deposit-interest rate (38) follows from Lemma 2 and Condition (29). The existence
of the loan-interest rate function (39) follows from Condition (37), an application of
the implicit function theorem, and the fact that R(i, rc) is non-decreasing in i and rc.
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Proof of Lemma 3.
(i) Follows directly from implicit differentiation of (39).
(ii) Implicit differentiation of (39) yields
∂rco∗
∂rE
(i, rE) =
∂R
∂rc
(
i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
∂R
∂rc
(
i, rco∗ (i, rE)
) ∂rc∗
∂rE
(i, rE) < 0.
(iii) Differentiation gives
∂∆o
∂rE
(i, rE) =
(
1
∂R
∂rc
(
i, rco∗ (i, rE)
) − [η − i∗]
S
)
∂R
∂rc
(
i∗, r
co
∗ (i∗, rE)
) ∂rco∗
∂rE
(i, rE) +
d1 + k1
S
Since ∂R
∂rc
(i, rc) > 0 for all i and all rc, the assertion follows from (ii).
Proof of Proposition 6.
(i) Since bankruptcies occur with positive probability, the average repayment R(i, rc)
is increasing in i for sufficiently small i ≥ i∗. The first assertion then follows from
Lemma 2 and Proposition 4.
(ii) Average repayments to simple banks are
E
[
P (·, i∗, r
c
∗)
]
=
∫ η
i∗
∫ q
q
min
{
q(1 + i)f, I(1 + rc∗)
}
h(q)dq di,
while average repayments to sophisticated banks are
E
[
P o
(
·, i∗, r
co
∗ (i∗, rE)
)]
= [η − i∗]R∗(i∗, rE).
The assumption on bankruptcies implies
E
[
P (·, i∗, r
c
∗)
]
> [η − i∗]R∗(i∗, rE)
and the assertion follows from a comparison of (12) with (38).
Proof of Proposition 7.
We have do2 ≥ d2 if and only if (50) holds Using (15) and (35), (50) is equivalent to
P
(
q, i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)
− P o
(
q, i∗, rE) ≤ E
[
P
(
·, i∗, r
c
∗(i∗, rE)
)]
− [η − i∗]R∗(i∗, rE). (55)
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The first term in (55) describes the difference in repayments between the two banking
systems, while the second term describes the difference in average repayments. Since
rco∗ (i, rE) < r
c
∗(i∗, rE) for all i > i∗, the first term of (55) is always non-negative. The
assumption regarding qoNB(η, rE) means that this term is positive for sufficiently high
shocks q. Since it is increasing in q, there exists qBE such that (55) hold with equality.
This implies that (55) and hence (50) holds if and only if q ≤ qBE. Since qBE depends
on i∗ and rE, this proves the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1.
We need to show that qocrit < qcrit in case (i) and q
o
crit > qcrit in case (ii). It follows from
Proposition 7 and the monotonicity of L and Lo that
0 < Lo(i∗, rE)− L
o(q, i∗, rE) < L(i∗, rE)− L(q, i∗, rE) for all q > qBE
and
Lo(i∗, rE)− L
o(q, i∗, rE) ≥ L(i∗, rE)− L(q, i∗, rE) for all q ≤ qBE.
Hence, the critical values must satisfy qocrit < qcrit in case (i) and the opposite inequality
must hold in case (ii). This proves the theorem.
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